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Pandemics are imbued with the politics of bordering. For centuries, border closures and restrictions 
on foreign travelers have been the most persistent and pervasive means by which states have 
responded to global health crises. The ubiquity of these policies is not driven by any clear scientific 
consensus about their utility in the face of myriad pandemic threats. Instead, we show they are 
influenced by public opinion and preexisting commitments to invest in the symbols and structures 
of state efforts to control their borders, a concept we call border orientation. Prior to the COVID-
19 pandemic, border orientation was already generally on the rise world-wide. This trend has made 
it convenient for governments to “contain” the virus by externalizing it, rather than taking costly 
but ultimately more effective domestic mitigation measures. We argue that the pervasive use of 
external border controls in the face of the coronavirus reflects growing anxieties about border 
control and border security in the modern international system. To a great extent, fears relating to 
border security have become a resource in domestic politics – a finding that does not bode well for 
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Pandemic Response as Border Politics 
 
“It stopped COVID, it stopped everything.”  
 
-Donald Trump, inspecting a section of concrete wall 
 on the US-Mexican border, 23 June 20201 
 
 
Pandemics are imbued with the politics of bordering. For centuries, border closures and 
restrictions on foreign travelers have been the most persistent and pervasive means by which 
states have responded to global health crises. The ubiquity of these policies is not driven by any 
clear scientific consensus about their utility in the face of myriad pandemic threats. Instead it is a 
reflection of their palliative impact on societies predisposed to express concern about that which 
is foreign in times of crisis. In this way, the pervasive use of external border controls in the face 
of the coronavirus reflects growing anxieties about border control and border security in the 
modern international system. 
Pandemics reveal national character under radical uncertainty. Leaders may decide to 
rewrite their crisis playbook or may deploy well-worn tropes that have provided reassurance in 
the past. The COVID-19 crisis has supplied plenty of evidence of the latter. Under uncertainty – 
and despite the recommendations of global health authorities – states that had already chosen to 
invest in border security have, on average, doubled down on that response to the pandemic. The 
politics that produce border security as a proper response to external threats have guided the 
COVID-19 response in many states as well. In this respect, pandemics – no less than migration 
waves or terrorist attacks – involve border politics. 
As evidence of this claim, we analyze states’ initial policy responses to the coronavirus 
spread. Borrowing from the interdependence literature, we consider policies of external versus 
 
1 Quoted in Time Magazine, available at https://time.com/5858294/trump-border-wall-coronavirus/.  
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internal adjustment. Policies can focus on externalizing the costs of pandemic control (by 
restricting travel, closing borders, and the like) and/or they can internalize these costs (by 
regulating social distance, contact tracing, regulating where and how many people gather).  In 
responding to the coronavirus pandemic, states have enacted a panoply of protective policies, but 
none more pervasive or persistent as international border controls.2 Political leaders clearly 
attempt to frame the options and to manipulate public opinion. For some, borders become a 
political resource and securing them is the policy of choice.  But such impulses are conditioned 
by the underlying script states follow when they embrace or filter The Other. 
The COVID-19 pandemic is a rare opportunity to examine national politics in response to 
a (nearly) exogenous transnational shock. Pandemic politics provide subtle but suggestive 
evidence of international borders’ important domestic role. As border scholars, we are especially 
concerned with how pre-existing routines of border governance influence the balance between 
policies of internalization and externalization. The initial policy mix is highly informative for 
understanding how international bordering is used to cope with major transnational shocks. 
States that have invested in the symbols and structures of border security are likely to respond to 
pandemic with international travel restrictions, border closure, and potentially even international 
defection. And though there is no necessary tradeoff, the comfort they take in externalizing and 
scapegoating may undercut the national will to fight a pandemic from within.  
For these reasons, we examine responses to the coronavirus pandemic through the lens of 
border politics. The first section demonstrates how common such externalization strategies are 
historically. Cooperative international efforts germinated in the nineteenth century but have been 
notoriously difficult to maintain. Hardening international borders in the face of perceived health 
 
2 Cheng et al. 2020.  
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threats is historically states’ first (and sometimes only) move. The second section makes the case 
that domestic publics tend to be amenable to externalization strategies, and many politicians find 
it easy to oblige. We argue that this urge to close borders is often better characterized by political 
calculations made at a time of uncertainty and fueled by fear, rather than responsive to the 
scientific evidence alone. 
The third section is the empirical heart of the paper. Here we present a preliminary foray 
into the evidence connecting border governance, internal mitigation policies, and externalization 
through border restrictions. We suggest that preexisting scripts for security tend to resurface in 
the face of pandemic uncertainty: physical border investments are strongly associated with 
border restrictions in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, but are weakly, perhaps even 
negatively associated with stringent internal mitigation strategies. These trends – and the 
variation around them – inform a much richer understanding of the broad ramifications of 
domestic and international border politics. We conclude that the coronavirus crisis underscores a 
need to refocus the international relations literature on broad issues of border governance 
currently salient in many parts of the world.3 In terms of policy, closed borders and unilateral 
action are poor substitutes for international cooperation and meaningful domestic health policies. 
 
I. Border Control and Closure: The Historical Pandemic Policy Default 
 
 Pandemic threats require sudden and consequential decision-making by state leaders. 
Which types of policies are most likely to reduce the spread of the disease? Should these actions 
be taken internally, at international borders, or both? How are the public health benefits weighed 
 
3 Simmons 2019. 
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against their economic impact? The answer to these questions should depend first and foremost 
on the nature of the biological threat, its etiology, mode of transmission, fatality rate, and the 
capability of modern medicine to reduce its impact on the affected. At the time of outbreak, 
however, policy makers are operating with incomplete information as the scientific community 
works rapidly to better understand the threat. As a result, state leaders reach for tools through 
which they can most readily assert authority. For the past several centuries, this has meant 
controls at territorial borders.  
 The historical record provides clear evidence that pandemic responses have been 
concentrated at the territorial borders of political authority. The term “quarantine,” for example, 
originates from the Italian quaranta giorni or 40 days, the amount of time foreign ships were 
required to anchor offshore during the 14th century outbreak of the bubonic plague. Italian city 
states continued to use systems of armed patrol ships, observation posts and horse patrols to 
enforce disease controls that lasted until the 1850s.4 Prior to the 19th century, countries often 
responded to pandemics through unilaterally applied and often redundant quarantine measures, 
whose inefficiency threatened international trade routes.5 Two devastating cholera outbreaks in 
the mid nineteenth century and outbreaks of yellow fever in North America were also notable for 
their emphasis on combatting transmission through focused measures taken at the edges of each 
state’s territorial jurisdiction. 
This pattern of responding to pandemics through increased border control has persisted 
for centuries. A series of international conferences and conventions aimed at coordinating 
containment efforts focused on the use of quarantine measures, despite a dearth of scientific 
information to inform whether such measures would prove effective. Four international public 
 
4 Cliff, Smallman-Raynor, and Stevens 2009. 
5 Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceição 2003.  
5 
 
health organizations were formed over the century between 1850 and 1951,6 marking a new 
scientific and public health information sharing and monitoring function but retaining their at-
the-border focus.7 Almost always, these measures prioritized state authority. This “Westphalian 
system of public health” coordinated quarantines to protect trade rather than public health and 
was carefully calibrated to protect territorial sovereignty.8 Border regions remained focal for 
pandemic control, even though the effectiveness of these measures remained speculative.   
Some militarized approaches have moderated over the years. For the most part states 
have abandoned the extreme cordons sanitaires – the use of military troops to contain disease at 
the border – used by France in the Pyrenees in 1821 in the face of an aggressive fever, at the 
border between Poland and Russia in 1918 to stop typhus from spreading west, and most recently 
during the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014.9 Diseases thought to be uncontrollable were 
not targeted by border measures. Richard Cooper relates how the international organizations of 
the 20th Century largely ignored diseases that could not be quarantined, in addition to those like 
smallpox, that were assumed to be universal.10 
Some scholars have observed important turning points in the latter part of the 20th 
century. The League of Nations’ specialized agencies were reputed to have performed better than 
its security organs, but beyond some localized successes (notable for their time) had limited 
health impact.11 In 1948 the World Health Organization (WHO) was founded and in 1951 it 
 
6 1902: Pan American Sanitary Bureau; 1907: Office International d’Hygiène Publique; 1923: Health Organization 
of the League of Nations; and 1948: World Health Organization. See Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceição 2003; Fidler 
1999. 
7  Arhin-Tenkorang and Conceição 2003. 
8 Fidler 2004. 
9  Donald G. McNeil Jr., “Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off Ebola-Racked Areas.” New 
York Times, August 12, 2014. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/science/using-a-tactic-unseen-in-a-
century-countries-cordon-off-ebola-racked-areas.html. 
10 Cooper 2001. 
11 Pedersen 2007. 
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passed International Sanitary Regulations which created a single but narrow set of rules for 
quarantine.12 The idea was again to control disease with a minimum of interference with world 
travel and trade.13 These rules were expanded into the International Health Regulations (IHR) in 
196914 and again in 200515 to cover a growing range of diseases and risks. These rules also 
called on WHO members to buttress public health capabilities at ports and airports “in ways that 
are commensurate with … public health risks and which avoid unnecessary interference with 
international traffic and trade.”16 Notably, the IHR has had difficulty anticipating the internal 
measures that would be appropriate for novel public health threats.  
Multilateral accomplishments in pandemic control were modest for most of the 20th 
century. The eradication of  smallpox, which was responsible for some 300 deaths world-wide 
during the 20th century, was not small feat but was more of a “Third World Intervention” led by 
the superpowers than a broader cooperative response.17 Not until the AIDS epidemic of the late 
1980s and the SARS outbreak of 2003 can interstate organizations be said to have actively 
promulgated internal measures to combat novel pandemics, often at the behest of non-state 
actors.18 Development support for domestic pandemic control replaced some of the singular 
emphasis on international borders as a control strategy. The WHO’s more active role signaled to 
some observers a turning point. According to David Fidler, “The SARS case study not only 
illuminates governance shifts in public health but helps highlight changes that may be occurring 
 
12 Stowman 1952. 
13 Fidler 2004, 33.  
14 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (1969): Third Annotated Edition. Available at 
https://apps.who.int/iris/handle/10665/224469.  
15 World Health Organization, International Health Regulations (2005). Select provision available at 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK143718/ 
16 International Health Regulations (2005), Article 2. 
17 See the Cold War context described in Manela 2010. 
18 See for example the discussion in Elbe 2010. 
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to the general structure and dynamics of international relations in the era of globalization.”19 
Even so, no state has surrendered or even pooled significantly its sovereignty over public health. 
Some even go as far as Indonesia to assert “viral sovereignty” – the right to any medical 
developments that are made on the basis of a flu strain originating within their territorial 
jurisdiction.20 Clearly, and in light of recent allegations of Chinese noncooperation and USA’s 
withdrawal from the WHO, it is premature to pronounce the death of a “Westphalian” model of 
pandemic policy response.  
Almost every analysis of the global response to pandemics mentions state sovereignty 
and social sensitivities over public health issues. Hygiene, norms of contact, trust in science, and 
the personal rights and privacy are often fraught social issues. And yet disease control may 
require domestically costly changes in beliefs and behavior. Lack of (or resistance to) scientific 
knowledge has made it easier to rely on border controls than internal mitigation strategies We 
believe a case can be made for the attractions of border security in case of COVID-19, especially 
as we will argue, for states invested in a narrative of the need for defense at the border. 
 
II. The Case of COVID-19 
 
Border policies have been a big part of the response to containing “viruses that know no 
boundaries.” But why? In this section we set the stage for an answer. Our central claim is that 
despite the intensification of globalization, and (often) despite scientific evidence, unilateral 
border control is a very tempting tool for sovereign states to wield in the face of a pandemic. A 
remarkable 186 countries responded to the contemporary coronavirus with external border 
restrictions, targeting travel from an average of 163 countries. 21 By contrast, only 127 countries 
 
19 Fidler 2004, 8. 
20 Elbe 2010, 171. 
21 Cheng et al. 2020.  
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have enacted social distancing provisions, and often with much weaker enforcement.22 Land 
borders have also been particularly focal. By our count, 92 countries had fully or partially closed 
their land borders by March 24. Even the internal borders of the European Union saw a return to 
border controls rare since the establishment of the Schengen Zone.23 Rhetorical bordering is also 
on the rise with several state leaders speculating about the foreign origin of the virus, often in 
derogatory terms. 
Such an overwhelming response might be understandable, if science spoke with a clear 
voice about border restrictions. However, the choice to institute border controls and closures are 
not generally driven by the data. A review of the scientific evidence available before the 
COVID-19 outbreak suggests that border controls, as they are generally implemented, are a 
rather ineffective way to control pandemics.24 Most of these studies demonstrate that controls at 
the border must be implemented very early in the spread of the pandemic – often well before the 
available evidence clearly indicates a threat. Studies have shown that social distancing is more 
effective than border controls for delaying the peak of pandemic infections.25 There may be a 
limited case for small isolated island states such as New Zealand26 or Taiwan, but border closure 
alone has not been shown to be effective and has been recommended against by the World 
Health Organization.27 In short, even though travel bans and border restrictions are of limited 
 
22 Ibid. 
23 For a list of notifications, see European Commission, “Temporary Reintroduction of Border Control.” Available 
at https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/schengen/reintroduction-border-
control_en.  
24 Bier 2020. 
25 Cacciapaglia and Sannino 2020. 
26 Boyd et al. 2017. 
27 See WHO, https://www.euronews.com/2020/03/13/world-health-organization-don-t-expect-travel-bans-to-beat-
coronavirus. See Bier 2020. 
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utility – very stringent ones at best buying a week or so to put domestic measures in place28 – 
they are the policy of choice in most countries around the world.  
 
Pandemics and the Problem of Uncertainty 
 
Why reach for border restrictions? One reason is that pandemics almost always introduce 
radical uncertainty into decision making. Experience bears this out. The emergence of the novel 
H1N1 virus compounded a list of unknowns: the scale of the problem, the range of (initially) 
small-scale trade-offs, uncertainty around detection and treatment, and of course the probability 
that modest numbers of cases will result in widespread outbreak.29 And what is learned from 
previous experience is not always relevant across the range of pandemic cases; influenzas alone 
involve so much genetic variation that it is difficult to predict their behavior, leading virologists 
to characterize pandemic influenzas as “certain uncertainties.”30 Importantly, uncertainty has 
consequences for whether, when, and which policy actions are taken. Uncertainty was probably a 
central reason for official decisional paralysis in the Ebola crisis, for example.31 
Then there are the uncertainties introduced by governance structures and policy 
communication. Whether uncertainty is acknowledged can differ across governance levels, 
illustrated by the confusion between federal state and local authorities in the United States, 
Mexico and Brazil, not to mention among the member states of the EU and the European 
Commission. 32  Communicating uncertainty itself is a sensitive policy problem: to frankly admit 
uncertainty can undermine public confidence.33 One study found that the communication of 
 
28 Wells et al. 2020 conclude that despite being some of the strictest in the world, China’s “border control measures, 
such as airport screening and travel restrictions, have …likely slowed the rate of exportation from mainland China to 
other countries, but are insufficient to contain the global spread of COVID-19.” [Italics added.] 
29 Reflecting on H1N1, see Lipsitch et al. 2009. 
30 Morens and Taubenberger 2011. 
31 Karlsen and Kruke 2018; Leduc and Liu 2020.  
32 Versluis, van Asselt, and Kim 2019. 
33 Backus and Little forthcoming; Driedger, Maier, and Jardine 2018. 
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uncertainty undermined collective action by “personalizing” responses to pandemic risks.34 
Others have emphasized that the first-order problems associated with scientific and policy 
uncertainty are compounded when they reverberate throughout the economy,35 rendering the 
assessment of trade-offs even more problematic.  
International borders are a handy heuristic for decision-making under uncertainty. They 
are focal and represent authoritative national power. Restricting them tends to impose lower 
costs on residents than internal restrictions on movement or business closures. Border restrictions 
are in this sense a good political bet for most leaders: they are fast and frugal.36  
 
 
Border Anxiety – a New Pandemic? 
 
Why then do states decide to respond to the inherent uncertainty pandemics present by 
limiting cross border movement? Why and under what conditions are border restrictions 
considered a prudent policy choice? One possibility is that publics and politicians have been 
priming a narrative of “dangerous others;” now, contagious foreign disease is just one more 
example of the broad and deep “border anxieties” that we have seen evidenced across a spectrum 
of issues over the past few decades.37 This anxiety has been on display, for example, in debates 
in the United Nations General Assembly, where border issues are drastically on the rise as a 
proportion of all official public discourse, and has trended decisively negative over the past 
 
34 Davis 2019. 
35 Baker et al. 2020. 
36 This phrase comes from management decision making under uncertainty by pairwise comparison (Luan, Reb, and 
Gigerenzer 2019), but seems an appropriate description in this context as well. 
37 For a discussion relating to migration, see Almond 2016. 
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decade.38 It is possible that the general anxiety around non-state forces at the border has simply 
been reproduced as a motivated response to the COVID-19 pandemic.  
 Border anxieties are also reflected in changes to the built environment along international 
borders. It is well known that states have constructed walls and fences along these zones. 39 
Border crossings increasingly bristle with the infrastructural capacity to filter a broad range of 
threats – from smuggled goods, to unwanted migrants, to local militias and neighboring 
militaries. Land borders provide a stark visual impression of this development. Figure 1 displays 
the thickening of filtering capacity at the US-Mexican border over two decades, but the trend is 
world-wide. Satellite and high-altitude imagery reveal the uneven but unmistakable build up 
official buildings, gates and barriers, and pull-out lanes where pedestrians and vehicles can be 
held for inspection.40 
 
     
Figure 1: Example of the build-up of “filtering capacity” at the US-Mexican border near Laredo/Nuevo Laredo, 1995, 
2002, 2010, 2015. Images from Google Earth, at 27.5972898,-99.536867. Average border orientation scores (discussed 
below) range from approximately 0.8 in 2002 to 2.2 in 2015.  
 
The erection of walls, police stations, and filtering infrastructure at interstate borders 
demonstrates how focal borders have become for enacting national security policies. The concept 
of border orientation helps to summarize this trend over time and space.41 It taps the extent to 
which the State is committed to filtering the movement of goods and people as they move into 
 
38 Simmons and Shaffer 2019. 
39 Carter and Poast 2015; Hassner and Wittenberg 2015; Avdan and Gelpi 2017. 
40 Simmons and Kenwick 2020. 
41 Ibid.  
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and out of their territory. Border orientation ranges from very permissive, where few means are 
taken to project control of state borders, to very controlling, where countries make large 
investments to assert control over ports of entry and the border region. Like many political traits, 
border orientation is latent and cannot be observed directly; it can, however, be inferred based on 
the physical investments manifest in the built environment. In our previous work, we have 
generated an estimate of border orientation using a latent variable modeling framework based on: 
(1) whether a country has built inspections facilities along roads crossing international borders;42 
(2) whether a country disproportionately polices its borders relative to the interior region; and (3) 
whether a country has built border walls facing its neighbors.43 The scores generated by a latent 
model of observed infrastructural investments represent a commitment to display authority at the 
border, with higher score representing more controlling border orientations. 
Over the past twenty years, countries have increasingly adopted controlling orientations, 
reflecting a concern about real and perceived threats across international borders. As displayed in 
Figure 2, we estimate that average border orientation has increased over the past two decades, 
with an inflection point that coincides with the 2008 financial crisis.44 This growth indicates that 
countries were already primed to see their borders as a means of defense, even before the risk of 
transnational contagion emerged. Not only have border closures spread more quickly than the 
virus did across borders, we are also seeing more unilateralism, and fewer attempts to coordinate 
internationally than we did in previous historical eras. It is perhaps no wonder then that the 
 
42 Data obtained from Carter and Poast 2015. 
43 The resulting measure is approximately normal, with a mean centered near zero, and an approximate range of -3 
to 3.  
44 As Simmons and Kenwick (2020) demonstrate, this pattern persists for virtually every region in the world with the 
exception of Western Europe.  
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“post-Westphalian,” at-the-source responses Fidler (2004) associated with AIDS and SARS, 
have given way to retrenchment. 
Borders are focal for pandemic policy, since they are an “obvious” starting point for a 
state to exert its authority.45 Border controls satisfy the need to do something quickly, decisively, 
and without raising questions of a state’s legitimate right to act. This is clearly not true for 
actions taken by the WHO,46 nor for internal regulations to stay home; witness the protests that 
have sprung up around the United States but also in Europe, South Asia, Africa and the Middle 
East.47 Border controls inconvenience relatively few nationals, yet satisfy the need for the State 
to appear to provide security. Meanwhile, border restrictions preserve (possibly fictitious) ideas 
that the threat is foreign, the State is competent, and the domestic population is, and can be kept, 
wholesome and healthy. For these reasons, border restrictions are attractive in a pandemic, 
especially for states that have invested in the symbols and structures of control. 
 
 
45  The international relations literature develops the idea of borders as focal point for purposes of making territorial 
claims internationally. Goemans and Schultz 2016. Our argument suggests an analogous purpose for domestic 
policy. 
46 See Stephen Buranyi, “The WHO v coronavirus: why it can’t handle the pandemic.” The Guardian, April 10, 
2020.  Available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/apr/10/world-health-organization-who-v-coronavirus-
why-it-cant-handle-pandemic 





Figure 2: Average global border orientation is intensifying, 2000-2019. The figure shows estimates of border 
orientation, a latent concept tapping state ability to project its authority to filter entry and exit at borders and 
border crossings. Higher values correspond to an increased commitment to filtering at the border. Based on 
satellite imagery of border crossings, documentation of border walls and fences, and the ratio of police stations in 
30 km border zones to the rest of a country. Source: author’s database (Simmons and Kenwick, 2020).  
 
Public Opinion: Demand from Within 
 
 
While border orientation is a characteristic of states, it often has foundations in the fears 
and anxieties of the public. How does mass opinion about border politics set the stage for 
pandemic response? It is often much easier to sell domestic audiences externalized adjustments 
through border restrictions than it is to sell to orders to cancel activities, social distance, and stay 
at home. Not to mention those emasculating masks!48 Publics experience many of the same 
uncertainties and anxieties that their leaders do. In addition, they can readily be primed to accept 
 
48 Teri Carter, “In my red state, people see masks as unmanly. That’s Trump’s fault.” Washington Post, June 1, 




border closures by leaders who are incentivized to engage in blame avoidance by framing 
pandemics as “foreign invasions.”49 Under these conditions, externalization is likely to be an 
easier sell than tough internal mitigation measures.  
Available polls bear this out. Polls conducted in mid-March 2020 across 12 countries and 
sampling 12,000 people show that significant majorities – some reaching 80% – support border 
closures as a response to the COVID-19 pandemic (Figure 3). Such high figures are surprising 
given the wording of the question: “We should close the borders of [my country] and not allow 
anyone in or out until the virus is proven to be contained.” (Emphasis added.) Sixty-two per cent 
of Americans agreed with this statement, even though it was worded to include a self-restriction 
(anyone). That proportion is about as high as support for border restrictions on migrants (not 
citizens) right after the 9/11 attacks.50 People appear to favor even stronger border restrictions in 




49 Such framing is historically common and includes targeting foreign countries as well as disfavored domestic 
minorities. See Charles Kenny, “Pandemics Close Borders – and Keep Them Closed.” Politico Magazine, March 25, 
2020. Available at https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-borders-history-plague-
146788 
50 For example, in three separate polls ranging between a month and six months after the 9/11 attacks, US residents 
answered as follows to these analogous questions: 
Question: Do you favor or oppose temporarily sealing US (United States) borders and stopping all immigration into 
the US during the war on terrorism? 65% said yes. 
Question: During the war on terrorism, do you favor or oppose each of the following measures?)... Sealing US 
(United States) borders and stopping all immigration for up to two years while the search for terrorists is 
conducted.  52% said yes. 
Question: During the war on terrorism, do you favor or oppose each of the following measures?)... Sealing US 
(United States) borders and stopping all immigration for up to two years while the search for terrorists is conducted. 
48% said yes. Source: author’s database of polls administered in the United States on border security, various years 





Figure 3: Public Opinion in 12 Countries on Border Closure as a Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic, 
March 12-14, 2020. Source: IPSOS. https://www.ipsos.com/en/majority-people-want-borders-closed-fear-
about-covid-19-escalates.   
 
At the time this poll was taken, mid-March 2020, the United States already had about 
1,300 confirmed cases and 40 COVID-19 deaths within our borders. The virus was already 
within US borders. Almost all scientifically informed advice was that it was imperative to 
implement serous internal mitigation measures. Nonetheless, within three days of the poll, the 
United States government closed the Mexican and Canadian land borders (despite lower 
infection rates and deaths in those countries) to all non-essential traffic.  
Extremely high majorities of the American public – about 8 out of 10 – favored travel 
bans against China and Europe in late March of 2020. Fewer but still a majority supported school 
closures and cancelling events, but of the 26% who said these internal measures were an over-
17 
 
reaction, nearly three-quarters still supported travel bans.51 Despite clear evidence that the virus 
was already in the US, as news of its spread mounted, more Americans favored travel bans than 
domestic mitigation policies.  
Of course, we do not view domestic attitudes about border restrictions as independent of 
elite cues and national politics. The need to externalize can be stoked by divisive rhetoric and 
nationalism. In some cases, public health policies become securitized52 in familiar ways. War 
allusions have peppered leaders’ speeches, from the Queen of England,53 to the US President,54 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations.55 Policy responses have in many cases displayed 
traces of such militarized rhetoric. Arguably, the securitization of pandemic influenza since the 
mid-1990s has resulted in policies “driven by national priorities and not the need for a coherent 
global public health response”56 among them, border closures especially by states whose 
authority was already cast to enhance to border control.  
In many countries, public opinion demands border protection in the face of the inherent 
uncertainty pandemics bring. A growing number of states are prepared to accommodate these 
fears with the authoritative symbols and structures of border security. The combination has 




51 Rasmussen, “Poll: 8 in 10 Americans Support Travel Bans on China and Europe to Limit Coronavirus Spread.” 
Available at https://www.peoplespunditdaily.com/polls/2020/03/18/8-in-10-americans-support-travel-bans-on-
china-and-europe-to-limit-coronavirus-spread/.  
52 On securitization theory see Balzacq 2005; Stritzel 2007; Wæver 1995. 
53 “Boris Johnson Hospitalized as Queen Urges British Resolve in Face of Epidemic” New York Times, April 5, 
2020. Available at https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/05/world/europe/coronavirus-queen-elizabeth-speech.html. 
54 “In coronavirus crisis, Trump says he is a 'wartime president.'” Washington Post, March 23, 2020. Video available 
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III. Border Closures and COVID: An Empirical Investigation 
 
The COVID pandemic has brought together the demand for protection from “foreign” 
virus threats with the supply of authoritative investments at the border to torque policy responses 
away from internal adjustments and toward externalization in the form of border closures. To 
illustrate the plausibility of at least the supply half of this claim, we use border orientation as a 
key explanatory variable, and rely on data provided by the Oxford COVID-19 Government 
Response Tracker as the dependent variable.57 This response tracker records information on 
whether and when governments have enacted various policies to combat COVID-19. At present, 
the data range from January 1 to June 17, 2020. While these data are clearly not suitable to make 
broad claims about how the COVID-19 crisis will be resolved, they are uniquely suited to 
exploring states’ initial responses. 
We make use of two measures derived from these data. First, to identify measures 
directed primarily toward foreign populations, we rely on the data set’s international travel 
control indicator, which includes five ordered categories: no measures taken, screening, 
quarantine arrivals from high-risk regions, ban on arrivals from some regions, and ban on all 
regions or total border closures. While these measures impact both foreign populations and 
citizens returning from abroad, they nevertheless approximate external control measures 
implemented at international ports of entry.58 Second, we construct a weighted average of the 
internal measures countries take to mitigate the domestic spread of the virus. These include 
school closures, workplace closures, cancellation of public events, restrictions on gatherings, 
closure of public transport, stay at home requirements, restrictions on internal movement, and 
 
57 Hale et al. (2020). Available at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/coronavirus-government-
response-tracker 
58 Future research should relax this assumption and specifically test for distribution of expected costs by controlling 
for external trade/travel dependence.  
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public information campaigns.59  Although the external control index is an ordinal five-point 
scale and the internal control index is virtually continuous, we transform each to range from 0, 
corresponding to minimum control, and 100, reflecting maximal controls. Comparing the 
stringency of response across these two dimensions approximates the balance of policies a 
country adopts that fall disproportionately on domestic and foreign populations.  
Figure 4 displays the global mean values for internal and external control measures 
across time. While these two variables are measured on separate scales, their relationship to each 
other over time is telling. Countries responded to the global outbreak first with external controls, 
and only secondarily with internal control measures. That these external controls were often 
implemented at a time when the WHO recommended against their use further underscores the 
return to at-the-border controls as pandemic response, perhaps reflecting the intensifying concern 
about border security over past two decades.  However, this might also reflect a reasonable 
impulse to contain the virus before more painful mitigation strategies become necessary – after 
all, studies have shown that to be effective restrictions such as travel bans must be early.60 And 
yet, some countries continued to ratchet up external controls even after containment had failed, 
as did the United States at its land borders with Canada and Mexico. Figure 4 reveals that 
countries have eased external controls more slowly than they have internal controls. This 
evidence is consistent with the externalization processes described in the previous section—in 
times of pandemic, there is an inclination to disproportionately implement costly policies that 
affect international actors relative to domestic constituents.  
  
 
59 The resulting measure is computed identically to the stringency index described in Hale et al. (2020) except that 
we remove the travel control indicator, given our interest in differentiating between policies targeting domestic and 
international populations.  




Figure 4: External Control Measures are Implemented Faster and Last Longer 
than Internal Control Measures. Note: Global means reported in bold lines, with 
individual country time-series displayed in thin lines beneath. Stringency data 
generated from Hale et al. (2020). 
  
Our central claim is that pandemic policy is shaped by border politics. By this we mean, 
by the prior degree of investment a country had previously made in bolstering its authoritative 
presence at international land borders (border orientation). While virtually all countries have 
now adopted some form of restrictions on international movement, they have varied considerably 
both in the time it took them to implement these measures, and, crucially, the extent to which 
they were paired with other policies to mitigate the spread of the virus internally (the policy 
mix). The reason this is important is because studies show that border control do little more than 
buy precious days to implement much more effective mitigation policies nationally. 
Descriptively, border politics shape this critical mix: countries otherwise highly concerned with 
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border security investments are faster in adopting controls that target foreign travel, but this 
alacrity is not always mirrored domestically. 
Figure 5 compares the average stringency of internal and external response measures to 
2018 estimates of border orientation, with positive values corresponding to increased 
commitment to filtering movement along international borders. Border orientation is more highly 
correlated with the adoption of external measures (𝜌𝜌 =0.395) than it is with internal control 




Figure 5: Border Orientation is More Strongly Associated with External Rather than Internal Control Measures 
to Combat COVID-19. Note: Average stringency scores since January 1 reported on vertical axes. Border 
orientation data obtained from Simmons and Kenwick (2020), stringency data generated from Hale et al. (2020).  
 
The same pattern obtains over time. Figure 6 compares the average degree of internal and 
external stringency across time. The left panel compares internal stringency to the days 
preceding or since a country’s first confirmed death to adjust for the degree of exposure to the 
virus. The right panel tracks calendar date since external measures are more responsive to the 
global, rather than to domestic outbreak. In the latter case, countries with more controlling 
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border orientations (displayed in red) implemented external controls more quickly and 
maintained them for longer than countries with intermediate (black) or permissive (green) border 
orientations. By contrast, there is less variation in the application of internal control measures 
and here these countries were slightly slower to implement restrictions in the early days of the 
virus, at least compared to countries with average border orientation scores. 
 
 
Figure 6: Countries with Controlling Border Orientations Implement External Controls More Quickly 
Relative to Internal Control Measures. Note: Border orientation scores above 0.56 displayed in red, below in 
green, with intermediate scores in black.  Bold lines report average stringency within each group. Border 
orientation data obtained from Simmons and Kenwick (2020), stringency data generated from Hale et al. (2020).  
Several mitigating factors complicate the interpretation of Figures 5 and 6, the most 
obvious of which is that border orientation tends to covary with wealth. While there are notable 
exceptions, richer countries tend to invest more to project control over their borders than do 
lower income countries (Simmons and Kenwick 2020). It is therefore difficult to disentangle 
whether some of the low-level responses observed among countries with permissive orientations 
(i.e., the green lines in Figure 6) were driven by a lack of will, or a lack of capacity.  
We therefore perform a simple regression analysis, reported in Table 1, to control for a 
small set of potential confounders. The dependent variable is the average stringency of COVID 
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response measures throughout the observation period, with average internal stringency reported 
in models 1-4, and average external stringency in models 5-8. In addition to logged GDP per 
capita we report models that control for a country’s liberal democracy score, and their logged 
population.61We also include a quadratic interaction term for GDP to account for the fact that 
low-level responses to coronavirus have been observed at both low and high levels of the 
development spectrum.  
Table 1: Correlates of COVID-19 Stringency Measures 
  
Dependent Variable Stringency of Internal Measures  Stringency of External Measures  
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Border Orientation 1.977 -0.925 -0.550 -0.884  0.328* 0.249* 0.240* 0.245* 
 (1.309) (1.420) (1.525) (1.504)  (0.073) (0.083) (0.089) (0.089) 
Logged GDP Per Capita  26.452* 26.284* 26.827*   0.986* 1.042* 1.030* 
  (6.829) (6.974) (6.850)   (0.398) (0.404) (0.405) 
Logged GDP Per Capita2  -1.464* -1.465* -1.498*   -0.058* -0.062* -0.061* 
  (0.393) (0.406) (0.399)   (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
V-Dem Liberal Democracy   2.646 4.467    0.191 -0.025 
   (4.611) (4.593)    (0.266) (0.035) 
Logged Population    1.422*     0.157 
    (0.602)     (0.271) 
Adjusted R2 0.0093 0.1151 0.1175 0.1494  0.1232 0.1551 0.1390 0.1354 
Observations  137 132 127 127  138 133 128 128 




The results present a striking picture. Across all model specifications, countries with prior 
investments projecting control over their borders were significantly more likely to implement 
rigid external control measures in response to the virus than those without such preexisting 
investments . By contrast, the relationship between border orientation and internal stringency is 
never significant. Mirroring Figure 5, when border orientation is run in a bivariate regression 
with the stringency of internal control measures, there is a positive, albeit insignificant 
 
61 Data on GDP and population come from the World Bank (2019), while democracy is measured using the V-Dem 
liberal democracy index (Coppedge et al. 2020). Population data are from 2019. We use 2017 GDP data due to slightly 
more missingness in recent years.  
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association. After controlling for wealth, however, the association actually becomes negative, 
and remains so in all subsequent regressions.62  
That countries predisposed to displaying authority at their borders are more likely to 
implement external restrictions is perhaps not surprising, but that these measures were not paired 
with commensurate action at home points to two worrying possibilities. The first is that external 
controls may be either explicitly or implicitly seen as policy substitutes, a regrettable conclusion 
in a world where the coronavirus has already permeated virtually every border in the world.63 
Second is that border orientation may be associated with externalizing public health adjustment 
costs onto foreigners, undermining beneficial transactions, stoking blame and reducing 
possibilities for international cooperation in the future. 
These results must be interpreted with caution—both the political and global health 
environments are still in flux, and policy responses are rapidly evolving. Nevertheless, this 
analysis was intended to characterize whether countries concerned with border security adopted 
externalizing policy responses to COVID-19, and indeed this appears to be the case. Additional 
testing is clearly necessary to isolate the causal mechanisms underlying these correlations and to 






62 The relationship between wealth and stringency is parabolic, with stringency highest among moderately rich states 
and lower among both the poorest and the wealthiest.  More research is necessary to confirm, but a possible 
explanation may be that wealth is correlated with respect for civil liberties, which may sometimes clash with 
perceptions of “authoritarian” restrictions on their freedom (“we are not China”). Low income countries have low 
capacity to do any of these things. The apex of the parabola – the peak in the middle - may represent the conjunction 
of preferences and means for internal control. 
63 To be clear: we are not presenting these results as causal proof of policy substitution, which would require a much 
more nuanced approach than presentation of two separate regressions.  
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When responding to the H5N1 virus, then Senators Barack Obama and Richard Lugar 
warned “exotic killer diseases are not isolated health problems half a world away, but direct and 
immediate threats to security and prosperity here at home.”64 How states respond to such “exotic 
killers” impacts millions of lives world-wide. One hopes that these responses are informed by 
science, but it is clear that they are formulated under uncertainty and shaped by fear. Leaders are 
paramount in providing appropriate information and assuaging these fears. But our research 
suggests that they are also likely to draw from some of the same narratives, symbols and 
capabilities in which the state has invested in the past.  
Pandemic responses are imbued with border politics. States that have invested heavily in 
border security tend to want to redeploy those investments in fighting global pandemics. As we 
have shown, border anxiety seems to be on the rise world-wide. Residents in some states seem 
very willing to close borders before staying home, even though the virus is already spreading 
domestically. Under these conditions, closing an international border may assuage some anxiety 
at low personal cost. 
We have argued that polities have latent traits that become manifest in their investments 
in the built environment along international borders. This border orientation is associated with a 
distinctive externally-focused response to pandemics. There is even some suggestive evidence 
that it may be associated with policy substitution – the avoidance of more effective domestic 
mitigation strategies. Much more research should be done to understand how narratives and 
structures from past border investments and security debates play into public health responses. 
The concept of border orientation is useful in this regard: it allows us to explore the extent to 
 
64 Remarks of U.S. Senator Barack Obama, Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill and the Avian Flu, July 18, 




which states return to old scripts in the face of novel threats. Responses to this particular crisis 
may have been shaped as much by pre-existing anxieties than by scientific innovation. The 
concept of border orientation gives special insights into these choices. 
Two broader points can be made about what scholars of international relations can learn 
about international borders from this global public health crisis. First, borders are not going away 
anytime soon. Long before the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, many scholars were grappling 
with the rise and apparent demise of globalization and its ramifications for the broader study of 
global politics and the neoliberal international order.65 While it is too soon to make firm 
declarations about the full impact of the coronavirus pandemic, it seems to have accelerated 
trends toward border hardening that pre-date COVID-19. While the increased pace of movement 
wrought by globalization may one day return, it appears that the current pandemic has hastened 
movement away from international cooperation and reinvigorated a my-nation-first approach.  
Second, we suggest that in addition to the traditional study of interstate border claims, 
researchers should view international borders as a potential domestic political resource. The 
current crisis shows how convenient it is, and how well it resonates politically, to assure 
domestic audiences that national leaders are taking prudent measures to protect them while 
minimizing the impact on daily life. International border politics is a useful tool in this regard. 
Clearly, border policies are at the nexus of comparative and international politics, involve 
security as well as political economy concerns, and require both objective data as well as 
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